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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
VERDEAN ILAS CARTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15278 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of theft by receiving, 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1953), attempted theft by extortion, Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-406 (1953) and being a habitual criminal, Utah Code 
Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953), in the Third District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOY~R COURT 
The appellant, Verdean Ilas Carter, was convicted by 
a jury of the crimes of theft by receiving and attempted theft by 
extortion on May 19, 1977, before the Honorable James S. Sawaya 
of the Third Judicial District Court. On June 8, 1977, the 
appellant was convicted of being an habitual criminal by the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya of the Third Judicial District Court. 
The appellant was sentenced by the court to serve one to fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison, for the indeterminate term of 
imprisonment provided by law, for the crime of theft by receiving, 
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not more than five years at the Utah State Prison, the indetermina• 
term of imprisonment provided by law for the crime of attempted 
theft by extortion, and five years to life imprisonment in the 
Utah State Prison, the indeterminate term of imprisonment provided 
by law for the crime of being an habitual criminal, the sentences 
to be served concurrently. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of guilt 
entered against him and a new trial, and in the case of his 
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a• 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime between the closing of the business on Friday, 
February 18, 1977, and 7:00a.m. on Saturday, February 19, 1977, 
Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, a wholesale and retail grain store, 
was burglarized (TR 21-22). The safe inside the building was 
broken into and two days worth of receipts were among the items 
missing (TR 22 ) . The receipts consisted of the customer's 
checks stapled to invoices (TR 22-23). The value of the checks 
stolen was estimated by .the company at thirty to thirty-five 
thousand dollars (TR 27) . 
The procedure followed by the company did not include 
a separate recording of the name and address of customers paying 
by check (TR 23); thus, without the checks and receipts, there was 
no way of determining who paid by check and the burglary resulted 
in a substantial loss for the company (TR 23, 26-27, 38-39, 41). 
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on the morning the burglary 
was discovered, Lloyd Ward, Co-Manager of Sterling H. Nelson & Sons 
received a telephone call from an unidentified caller who asked 
"Do you want your checks back?" (TR 23-24). Upon Mr. Ward's 
affirmative answer, the caller asked if he would pay for the checks 
Mr. Hard told the caller he would pay $500.00 and the caller said 
"You will be hearing from me." (TR 24-25). The same day, Mr. 
Ward received a second phone call at approximately 3:00p.m. from 
the same caller indicating that he did not want the police involved, 
that he had $60,000.00 worth of the business' checks and that he 
wanted at least $5,000.00 (TR 24-25). The caller also threatened 
to '"torch the place"' and destroy the checks if the police were 
- 3 -
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involved (TR 24, 29). Mr. T,,Jard received a third telephone call 
on Monday from the caller which relayed information similar to the 
second call on Saturday. 
Ralph Nelson, Senior Manager of the business, received 
six to eight subsequent telephone calls from an unidentified man 
in the course of the same week concerning an agreement to receive 
$5,000.00 in exchange for the checks (TR 43). On approximately 
February 25, 1977, Mr. Nelson was instructed by the caller that 
a substantial amount of checks would be left in a shopping cart 
on the west side of the Grand Central building at 33rd South and 
Main Street to prove that the caller had the balance of the checks. 
(TR 34-35). Mr. Nelson immediately went to the location and 
retrieved the checks which totalled approximately $6,000.00 and 
were made payable to the business (TR 35). 
On the following Monday, the caller asked Mr. Nelson if 
he was willing to pay $5,000.00 and if he would be willing to go 
through an attorney in order to receive the merchandise, (TR 35-36 
When Mr. Nelson consented to go through an attorney, the caller 
informed him that it would cost an additional $500.00 which Mr. 
Nelson agreed to pay (TR 36). There was some discussion of using 
the company's attorney but the idea was not pursued and no attorne: 
was actually named in the discussions (TR 45-47). At 11:30 p.m 
of the same day, Mr. Nelson received a phone call setting up an 
agreement as to the means of delivering the $5,500.00 and receiv:11 
the checks (TR 36, 47). Mr. Nelson was called by Mr. Green of 
the Salt Lake City Police Department on the following day and 
told that the checks were in the oossession of the police depar 
- 4 -
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ment (TR 36). 
On the evening of February 28, 1977, Robert VanSciver, 
an attorney in Salt Lake City, received a call from the appellant, 
Verdean Carter. Van Sciver had represented the appellant in the 
past and was performing services with respect to a settlement of 
a civil matter at the time (TR 51, 60). The appellant asked Van 
Sciver if he could deliver a package to Van Sciver's office and 
if Van Sciver would give the package to somebody if they came to 
redeem it from him. Mr. Van Sciver indicated that he would agree 
(TR 52). The following day, March 1, 1977, the appellant went to 
Van Sciver's office at approximately 8:15 a.m. with a package 
where he met Van Sciver, who was on his way out the door. The 
appellant and Van Sciver went into the office where the appellant 
placed the package on the floor (TR 53). The appellant told 
Van Sciver to call the person whose name appeared on the checks 
and that they would bring in some money and pick up the checks. The 
amount of money referred to was $5,500.00, $500,00 of which was 
to be retained by VanSciver (TR 53-54). Mr. VanSciver told 
the appellant "It smells. I don't like this." (TR 55). Mr. Van 
Sciver further stated that he thought the arrangement sounded like 
an extortion plot, to which the appellant responded, ··~.Jell, it is." 
(TR 88). Van Sciver told the appellant he intended to tell the 
police "to cover my ass." The appellant told VanSciver that the 
person to whom the checks belonged did not want the police in-
volved and that he didn't need to feel like he had to discuss it 
with the police (TR 55). 
- 5 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Van Sciver then went directly to the coffee shop in 
the Metropolitan Hall of Justice and saw Captain Patrick of the 
Salt Lake City Police Department whom he told about the package 
(TR 56). Van Sciver, on the same day, spoke with Deputy County 
Attorney John Nielsen and Salt Lake City Police Detectives Young 
and Stoner about the situation. Without revealing the appellant's 
name or his conversations with the appellant, Van Sciver told 
them where the package was and that they could examine it (TR 57) 
Later the same afternoon, Van Sci ver telephoned appellant 
at his place of employment at Z.C.M.I. Shoe Repair and told him 
that the checks were in the hands of the police (TR 66). The 
appellant said, "Don't worry I can still make it fly" and "I'll just 
tell them to deliver the money to you; that the checks are in the 
hands of the police." (TR 69). VanSciver also assured the 
appellant that under no circumstances would he disclose the 
defendant's name (TR 70). Subsequently, Van Sciver was subpoenec 
and ordered to reveal the appellant's identity, which he did (TR5f 
The appellant was arrested by Officer Jake Green later 
in the afternoon of March 1, 1977, at his place of employment and 
taken to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office for interrogation 
(TR 76-77). The appellant voluntarily gave a statement to the 
police (TR 78-79). He stated that he was approached by an 
individual two days earlier and asked if there was a way to havea 
lawyer get some checks back to the company (TR 79) . 
The anpellant was advised by the individual that in retul 
for his assistance, "they would take care of him," meaning there 
- 6 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was more than one person involved (TR 84). The appellant admitted 
that he believed some type of fraud was involved in the arrangement; 
that he went to Van Sciver's office with another individual and 
that he delivered the checks to Van Sciver so that the checks could 
be returned to their owner while the unidentified individual waited 
in the car (TR 82, 85-86). 
At the trial, the appellant testified that an individual 
advised him that he had a whole bunch of checks and he didn't 
know how to get them back to the owners so he was going to destroy 
them (TR 125). The individual stated that he had talked to the 
owner who was willing to pay a reward for the return of the checks 
and to go through a lawyer to get them back (TR 126). The appellallt 
later saw the checks at the individual's home and thought they 
valued approximately $50,000.00 (TR 128) . The appellant testified 
as to his concern that the checks be returned to the owners because 
a loss of $50,000.00 could bankrupt a business (TR 131) . The 
appellant believed that the parties would give him a part of the 
$5,000.00 paid by the owners and he stated he would have accepted 
the money (TR 130-131). The appellant related his conversations 
with Van Sciver in which he admitted that the transaction could be 
extortion. At no time did the appellant tell Van Sciver not to 
return the checks if the money was not paid or attempt to retrieve 
the checks when Van Sciver said he intended to call the police 
(TR 131, 133). The appellant told VanSciver not to contact the 
police only because the individual who accompanied him to Van 
Sciver's office said so (TR 133). The appellant did not believe 
- 7 -
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he was personally involved in crime and wished to remain anonymous 
to avoid an embarrassing situation with the police (TR 135). It 
was always the appellant's understanding with Van Sciver that Van 
Sciver would not divulge his identity to the police (TR 135). 
Floyd Ledford, a police officer for Salt Lake City, 
assigned to the Detective Division, testified in behalf of the 
appellant (TR 100-101). Officer Ledford testified concerning 
his acquaintance· with the appellant for six or seven years and his 
work with the appellant as an informant over the past two years 
(TR 101-102). The officer stated that the appellant had provided 
the police with several leads concerning the crimes in the region 
and in one instance, the appellant's information led to the recover 
of approximately $100,000.00 worth of jewelry stolen (TR 102-105) 
At the conclusion of the trial on Counts I and II of the 
Information and after the jury had returned a verdict of guilty, 
the jury was dismissed. The appellant waived his right to a jury 
trial on Count III of the Information, the Habitual Criminal Charge 
and the matter was tried to the Court on June 8, 1977 (TR 201, 2C 
The appellant made a motion to dismiss Count III on the grounds 
that such prosecution in this case constituted a selective enforce-
ment of the statute and presented evidence in support of the Motior 
(TR 200) . 
Gerald Kinghorn, Assistant County Attorney, testified 
that the appellant was the first individual to be prosecuted unde' 
the Habitual Criminal Statute since it was reenacted into law ir- ~S 
He also stated there are no written guidelines setting forth 1-1hc 
to use the habitual criminal prosecution (T~ 208). Further, ~r 
- 8 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Kinghorn could identify only one other person as being prosecuted 
under that statute in Utah since 1970 (TR 208). 
David E. Yocom, Deputy County Attorney for Salt Lake 
County, testified that he was in charge of the Career Criminal pro-
gram for Salt Lake County, a federally funded administrative test 
program (TR 212). He testified that only one other individual had 
been charged with being a Habitual Criminal under the statute since 
July, 1975 and that the Complaint against that individual was dis-
missed at Preliminary Hearing. This was true despite the fact that 
the Career Criminal program became effective in the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office in July of 1975 and 260 individuals had been pro-
secuted under the program since its inception (TR 213). According 
to Mr. Yocom, there were seven criteria for determining persons to 
be prosecuted under the program, including the criteria of two or 
more convictions for serious felony offenses (TR 213). Mr. Yocom 
testified that none of these 260 were individuals against whom the 
County Attorney could have filed and proven the elements of being 
a Habitual Criminal pursuant to the statute (TR 214). He noted that 
some cases involving out-of-state and federal convictions were not 
filed due to the difficulty of proving that the conviction was a 
felony of the first or second degree (TR 216-217). However, one of 
the convictions relied upon in the appellant's case is a conviction 
from the State of California (TR 217). 
The prosecution submitted as Exhibit 1 an authenticated 
copy of a judgment and conviction from the State of California naming 
Verdean Ilas Carter as the defendant and showing that the defendant 
pled guilty to the offense of Robbery (TR 218-219). The Court 
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took judicial notice of Section 213 of the California Penal Code 
which provides for a sentence of not less than five years for the 
crime of First Degree Robbery (TR 221-222). Exhibit 2 reflectec 
a Utah conviction of Verdean Ilas Carter showing that the defendant 
entered a plea of guilty to the crime of Attempted Robbery and was 
connnitted to the Utah State Prison for a term of two and a half to 
twenty years (TR 219). 
Based on the appellant's admission during the trial of 
Counts I and II that he was the same Verdean Ilas Carter as named 
in the Utah and California convictions represented by Exhibits 1 ar 
2, the Court found the appellant guilty of Count III (TR 137, 
138, 223, 226). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE HABITUAL CRIHINAL STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§76-8-1001 (AS AMENDED 1975), IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 
A. 
THE STATUTE VIOLATES THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO 
EOUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAHS AS PROVIDED IN THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDHENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND HIS RIGHT TO THE UNIFORM OPERATION 
OF THE LAWS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
The appellant first contends that the Habitual Crimina: 
Statute is unconstitutional on its face because the legislature 'J 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The statute provides as follows: 
76-8-1001. Habitual Criminal -- Determination --
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, 
and committed for felony offenses at least one of 
which offenses having been at least a felony of the 
second degree or a crime which, if committed within 
this state would have been a capital felony, felony 
of the first degree or felony of second degree, 
and was committed to any prison may, upon conviction 
of at least a felony of the secon degree committed 
in this state, other than murder in the first or 
second degree, be determined as a habitual criminal 
and be imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life. [Emphasis Added] 
The choice of enforcement provided in the statute through interjectior 
of the word ''may" discriminates against the appellant in violation 
of his right to equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 
the right to uniform operation of laws as provided in Article I, 
Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah. 
The scope of discrimination permissible under the law has 
been examined by the Utah Supreme Court. In Hansen v. Public 
Employees Retirement System Board of Administration, 122 Utah 144, 
246, P.2d 591 (1952), Justice Crockett stated for the Court: 
An act is never unconstitutional because of 
discrimination so long as there is some reasonable 
basis for differentiation between classes which is 
related to the purpose to be accomplished by the 
act. And it aoolies uniforml to all ersons with-
in the c ass. State v. Mason, Uta 0 , 7 P. d 
920, 117 A.L.R. 330; Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 
Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, 9 A.L.R. 2d 712. (Emphasis 
Added] 
The Court affirmed the approach taken in the Hansen case 
in Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (1975), where again 
Justice Crockett wrote: 
- 11 -
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. different treatment of individuals does 
not necessarily violate the equal protection of 
the laws assurances. They may be treated differently 
by the law or by legal procedures which divide them 
into classifications, if the classifications have 
a reasonable relationship to a proper and lawful 
purpose, and if all ersons within the same class 
are treated equa y. Emp asis Ad ed 
Although the statute permissibly defines a class of persons subject 
to the provisions, it fails to insure the uniform and non-discrimin 
tory treatment of the class of habitual criminals. Through use of 
the permissive word "may" in §76-8-1001, the prosecution is granted 
license to abuse discretion and subjectively inflict the provisions 
of the statute. Appellant is not lacking authority for this positi 
In State v. Cory, 204 Ore. 235, 282 P.2d 1054 (1955), the Oregon 
Supreme Court reached the same conclusion with respect to that stat 
habitual offender statute. Similar to ~76-8-1001, the Oregon 
statute provided that upon a finding of the requisite prior con-
victions not involving crimes of personal violence, the district 
attorney may file an information accusing the person of the previou 
convictions. The Court held that the portion of the statute giving 
the district attorney discretion to determine whether to file an 
information against a person previously convicted of a felony not 
involving personal violence was unconstitutional under the equal 
protection clause of the state and federal constitutions, Writing 
for the Court, Justice Latourette stated: 
. there is no yardstick or semblance of 
classification which would enable the district 
attorney to determine under what circumstances an 
information should be filed. The exercise of 
absolute discretion is vested in the district 
attorney in such a circumstance. In other words, 
the fate of persons, even to the extent of life 
- 12 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
imprisonment, who have committed the same 
acts under the same circumstances and in like 
situations is determined by the whim and caprice 
of the district attorney.,. 282 P. 2d at 1056. 
The Utah Habitual Criminal Statute is equally deficient 
in providing appropriate and concise guidelines for the uniform 
application of the law. Recent years have seen increasing demands 
for control of the decision to prosecute by establishing guidelines 
on standards to implement the avowed purposes behind the American 
Criminal Justice System. The benchmark in this area is embodied 
in the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function §3.9. The prosecution 
of habitual offenders based on no standards runs afoul of the 
constitution since it can serve none of the utilitarian purposes 
demanded by the criminal sanction. As is noted in the aforecited 
A.B.A. Standards: 
The charging decision is the heart of the 
prosecution function. The broad discretion 
given to a prosecutor in deciding whether to 
bring charges and in choosing the particular 
charges to be made requires that the greatest 
effort be made to see that this power is used 
fairly and uniformly. (A.B.A. Standards, infra 
§3.9 Commentary at 93). See also A.B.A. Code 
of Professional Responsibility DR7-103(A). 
In the present discretionary statureJ §76-8-1001 fails 
to insure the uniform operation of the law and the equal protection 
of individuals culpable thereunder and therefore must be found 
invalid on its face. 
Appellant next contends that the Habitual Criminal Statute 
was selectively and capriciously applied against him in violation 
of his right to equal protec.tion of the laws. 
- 13 -
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In Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) the United States 
Supreme Court considered a similar challenge to the West Virginia 
recidivist statute. Rejecting the Petitioner's claim, then Justic 1 
Tom C. Clark speaking for the majority of a S-4 divided Court 
stated: 
" . . . the conscious exercise of some selectivity 
is not in itself a federal constitutional violation. 
Even though the statistics in this case might imply 
a policy of selective enforcement, it was not 
stated that the selection was deliberately based 
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religion, or other arbitrary classification. 
Therefore grounds supporting a finding of a denial 
of equal protection were not alleged. Oregon v. 
Hicks, [213 Ore. 619, 325 P.2d 794 (1958)); cf. 
snQWQon v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); Yick Wo v. 
Ho~kins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (by implication)." (3 8 U.S. at &56] 
It is nonetheless clear as indicated in Oyler v. Boles 
that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of Equal Protection of 
the law applies as well to the enforcement of penal laws as it doe 
in other contexts. Thus, the prosecution of an individual in an 
arbitrary manner violates the Fourteenth Amendment and such a 
prosecution must be dismissed. 
The seminal case in this area is that of Yick Ho v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064; 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). In tl: 
case certain city ordinances, which regulated the business of 
operating a laundry, although valid facially, were found by the 
Court to be discriminatorily enforced against the Chinese popul~ 
In Yick Wo the Court noted that although a: 
" . . . law itself be fair on its face and impartial 
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered 
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practicaL 
to make unjust and illegal discriminations between 
persons in similar circumstances material to their 
- 14 -
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rights the denial of equal justice is still within 
the prohibition of the Constitution." (118 U.S. 
at 373, 374). 
It becomes clear from Yick Ho and Oyler v. Boles that 
raising a challenge of discriminatory enforcement of a penal statute 
stands on firm constitutional soil. The Courts have apparently 
gone beyond a limited reading of Ovler v. Boles and have held the 
Oyler does not preclude the granting of relief against intentional 
and purposeful discrimination against an individual since such 
conduct was not alleged in Oyler. See Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89 
(2d Cir. 1963) (opinion by Judge Lambard). The case of United 
States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) gives such a reading 
to the Yick Wo-Oyler line of decisions. In that case the Seventh 
Circuit reversed the District Court and held that the defendant 
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of discriminatory 
enforcement for failure to possess a draft card. In so doing the 
court did not require a discriminatory distinction based on the 
traditional invidious classifications of race or religion but applied 
Oyler in such a way so as to indicate that the potential chilling 
effect on first amendment rights of such a prosecution falls within 
the category of "other arbitrary classifications." 
A similar result was reached in United States v. Steele, 
461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972), which involved a conviction for 
refusing to answer questions in a census report in violation of 
13 U.S.C. §221 (a). The defendant argued that he had been de-
liberately selected for prosecution because of his participation 
in a census resistance movement. The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit agreed that there was evidence that Steele had been 
- 15 -
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singled out for prosecution on the basis of his exercise of 
First Amendment rights and concluded that his conviction could not 
stand under Oyler and Yick Ho. 
Convictions were also reversed in United States v. 
Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972), on a finding that an 
unlawful and discriminatory purpose precipitated the indictments. 
The arrests in that case were for violations of a disorderly con-
duct regulation which prohibited loud and unusual noise and ob-
struction of passageways and a regulation forbidding the distribu-
tion of handbills without prior permission of the federal agency 
in whose space the material was to be distributed. 
The point that these cases make is that purposeful 
discrimination in the enforcement of penal laws may be arbitrary 
and hence unconstitutional under the ~ rationale even though 
the discriminatory effect does not manifest itself in traditional 
categories of race or religion. See also People v. Utica Daw's 
Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S. 2d 128 (1962). 
In the instant case, the evidence shows that the appella: 
was the sole individual prosecuted under the Utah Habitual Crimina 
Statute in the two years since its reenactment. This statistic 
is particularly suspect in view of the fact that 260 individuals 
have been prosecuted under the Career Criminal program alone dur:J 
the same two years and one of the criteria for Career Criminal 
treatment is two or more convictions of serious felonies. 
Mr. Yocom, the Deputy County Attorney in charge of the 
Career Criminal program, testified the Habitual Criminal charges 
may not be filed against so~e defendants who have out-of-state 
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convictions due to the difficulty of proof. Yet the appellant had 
an out-of-state conviction which was used against him. Appellant 
contends that the difficulty of proof of out-of-state convictions 
is not a viable excuse since presumably the County Attorney has acces~ 
to the statutes of other states by which the classification of 
the conviction can be as readily determined as it was in the instant 
case. 
The evidence supports the appellant's claim that the County 
Attorney purposefully and intentionally singled out the appellant 
for prosecution under the Habitual Criminal Statute while it has 
declined to prosecute others equally culpable. Such prosecution 
was arbitrary and resulted in unlawful discrimination against the 
appellant in violation of his rights to the equal protection of 
the laws. 
B. 
THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE ALLOl.JS FOR AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY THE 
LEGISLATURE TO THE EXECUTIVE TO FIX AND/OR ENHANCE 
PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME. 
As noted previously, Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001, 1002 
(as amended 1975) grants discretion to the county attorney or 
prosecuting authority to charge any criminal defendant who meets 
the requirements of §1002 with being a habitual criminal, and 
therefore subjecting such person to an enhancement of punishment 
for whatever other crime he is convicted of. Such enhancement is 
"from five years to life." The statute however, does not require 
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the case of every individual who meets the criteria, but rather, 
uses the permissive word "may" in §1001. Appellant contends that 
this discretion represents exactly the unconstitutional delegatic: 
of authority by the legislature of the power to fix punishment 
which was condemned by this Court in its recent decision in State 
v. Gallion, ___ Ut.2d _____ P.2d.~(Ut. Sup. Ct. No. 14966. 
Nov. 17 , 19 77) . 
In Gallion, this Court struck down a section of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act which gave the Attorney General, a 
member of the Executive Department, the power to define and fix 
punishment for crime. Writing for the majority, Justice Maughn 
observed: 
"In the Controlled Substances Act, the administrator 
not only determines that a substance should be 
controlled, he further schedules the substance, 
which in effect, declares the magnitude of the 
penalty and fixes the punishment. The administrator 
is exercising an essential legislative function 
which cannot be transferred to him." (No. 14966 
at P.5) 
Under Utah law, the various county attorneys are clear!) 
members of the Executive Branch supervised by the Attorney Genera: 
Utah Code Ann. §67-5-1 (1953) provides: 
"It is the duty of the attorney general: 
. . . (5) To exercise supervisory powers over 
the district and county attorneys of the state 
in all matters pertaining to the duties of their 
offices, and from time to time require of them 
reports as to the condition of public business 
entrusted to their charge." 
It is clear from a reading of §76-8-1001, 1002 that the 
court cannot on its own invoke the enhancement of punishment pro· 
vided for. The determination as to when the section is invoked 
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rests soley within the discretion of the county attorney or other 
prosecuting authority as the case may be. 
Because Habitual Criminal Statutes are clearly enhancement 
of punishment provisions rather than substantive crimes (see e.g. 
Moore v. Mo., 1 59 U.S. 613, 40 L.Ed. 2301, 16 S.Ct. 179 and Graham 
v. W. Va., 224 U.S. 616, 56 L.Ed. 917, 32 S.Ct. 583), the legislature 
has allowed the county attorney or other prosecuting authority to, 
in effect, fix the punishment of an appropriate offender. This 
permissive approach makes Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 and 1002 (as 
amended 1975) an unconstitution delegation of authority which rests 
exclusively within the legislative perogative. As Justice Maughn 
observed in State v. Gallion, supra: 
'' ... (T)he authority to define crimes and 
fix the punishment therefore is vested exclusively 
in the legislature, and it may not delegate that 
power . . . A determination of the elements of 
a crime and the appropriate punishment therefore 
are, under our Constitutional system, judgments 
which must be made exclusively by the legislature." 
(Sup. Ct. Case No. 14966 at P.6) [Emphasis supplied] 
Appellant urges a reversal of the trial courts judgment 
of punishment pursuant to the Habitual Criminal charge and dismissal 
of that charge. 
- 19 -
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS ROBERT VAN SCIVER'S TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING HIS COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE APPELLANT 
BECAUSE THE COMMUNICATIONS HERE PRIVILEGED THROUGH 
THEIR ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. 
The importance and sanctity of the attorney-client privi 
is clearly recognized in Utah, as reflected by the provisions in 
Utah Code Annotated §78-24-8(2) -- Privileged Communications, 
§78-51-26(5). Duties of attorney and counselors, and Rule 26 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. The general purpose of the privilege 
is set forth in §78-24-8: 
There are particular relations in which it is the 
policy of the law to encourage confidence and to 
preserve it inviolate. Therefore a person cannot 
be examined as a witness in the following cases: 
(2) An attorney cannot, without the consent of 
his client, be examined as to any communications 
made by the client to him, or his advice given 
therein, in the course of professional employ-
ment, ... 
At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress in the instant 
case, Mr. Van Sciver testified that he and the appellant had an 
on-going attorney-client relationship (Suppression Hearing Transc 
II). Further, Mr. Van Sciver testified to his belief that the 
appellant contacted him on this occasion because Van Sciver was a 
attorney and the appellant sought his services in that capacity 
(Suppression Hearing Transcript 10). The appellant's position~ 
that his consultation with Mr. Van Sciver concerned a past crimE 
The prosecution alleged that the communications between 
the appellant and Van Sciver were not privileged under Rule 26\: 1 
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of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 26 sets forth the standard 
required before a communication can be removed from the realm of 
privilege: 
(2) Exceptions. Such privileges shall not 
extend (a) to a communication if the judge 
finds that sufficient evidence, aside from 
the communication, has been introduced to 
warrant a finding that the legal service was 
sought or obtained in order to enable or aid 
the client to commit or plan to commit a 
crime or a tort, 
Justice Cardoza examined this exception to the attorney-
client privilege in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct. 
465, 77 L.Ed. 993, 1000 (1932): 
To drive the privilege away, there must be 
something to give colour to the charge; there 
must be prima facie evidence that it has some 
foundation in fact. 
At the hearing, the prosecution presented no independent evidence 
to support the contention that the communication was not privilegec 
The appellant further contends that Mr. VanSciver's 
exercise of judgment was faulty and premature. Mr. Van Sciver 
testified that his conversations with the appellant were quite 
brief. At no time before going to the police did Mr. Van Sciver 
pause to examine the potential conflicts with his client, the 
appellant, nor did he seek to ascertain the exact nature of the 
appellant's involvement. Rather, Mr. VanSciver permitted his 
personal concurs to prevail over those of his client. Such conduct 
contravenes the role and duty of an attorney as set forth in the 
statutes: 
§78-51-26. Duties of Attorneys and Counselors. 
It is the duty of an attorney and counselor: 
(5) To maintain inviolate the confidences, and 
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at every peril to himself preserve the secrets 
of his client. 
The fact that the communications related by Mr. Van 
Sciver were incriminating to the appellant cannot warrant the use 
of that evidence because it was secured in the breach of Mr. Van 
Sciver's duty to the appellant. 
Appellant does not dispute Mr. Van Sciver's propriety in 
relinquishing the receipts to the police. A similar result was 
compelled by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington in 
State v. Olwell, 64 Hash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681, 16 A.L.R. 3d 1021, 
(1964). In that case, the attorney refused to comply with a sub-
poena duces tecum requesting the production of knives in his 
possession and control relating to his client, claiming the attorn 
client privilege and the client's privilege against self-incrimina 
tion. In holding that the knife was obtained through a confidenti 
communication by the client, the Court stated: 
To be orotected as a privileged communication, 
information or objects acquired by an attorney 
must have been communicated or delivered to him 
by the client, and not merely obtained by the 
attorney while acting in that capacity for the 
client. [394 P.2d at 683] 
The court held the subpoena duces tecum defective on its face and 
therefore the attorney was not compelled to comply with it. Howe1 
the court further ruled the evidence was accessible to the proseo 
tion for use in a subsequent criminal proceeding when certain cor.· 
trols were applied: 
"Such evidence given the attorneyduring legal 
consultation for information purposes and used 
by the attorney in preparing the defense of his 
client's case, whether or not the case ever goes 
to trial, could clearlv be withheld for a 
reasonable period of time. It follows that the 
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attorney, after a reasonable period, should, 
as an officer of the court, on his own motion 
turn the same over to the prosecution . . . 
The prosecution, upon receipt of such evidence 
from an attorney, where charge against the 
attorney's client is contemplated (presently 
or in the future), should be well aware of the 
existance of the attorney-client privilege. 
Therefore, the state, when attempting to intro-
duce such evidence at the trial, should take 
extreme precautions to make certain that the 
source of the evidence is not disclosed in the 
presence of the jury and prejudicial error is 
not committed. By thus allowing the prosecution 
to recover such evidence, the public interest is 
served, and by refusing the prosecution an 
opportunity to disclose the source of the evidence, 
the client's privilege is preserved and a balance 
is reached between these conflicting interests." 
[394 P.2d at 685] 
Under the rule propounded in Olwell, the prosecution is entitled 
to the receipts but it cannot divulge the source of the evidence 
in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 
The essence of the Olwell result is to maintain the 
client's privilege as to identity. Circumstances warranting the 
application of the attorney-client privilege to the identity of the 
client have been recognized by numerous courts. Baird v. Koerner, 
279 F.2d 623 (CA9, 1960), Exparte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 
P.566 (1915), See generally 16 A.L.R. 3d 1047. The application 
of the privilege to the client's identity is most compelling where 
the client retains the attorney with the specific purpose of 
keeping his identity confidential. The New York Court of Appeals 
examined this situation in In Re Kaolan, 8 N.Y. 2d 214, 168 N.E.2d 
660 (1960) and held that where an attorney is retained confidentially 
by a client to pass certain information to a public investigating 
body, he cannot·be jailed for contempt of court because he is willing 
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to disclose the information but not his client's identity. In 
the instant case, the appellant did not wish communication to be 
conveyed to the police. However, his purpose in delivering the 
receiptsto Mr. VanSciver parallels the client's motivations in 
Kaplan in that the appellant's concern was that the receipts be 
returned to the rightful owner. 
In summary, the appellant's communication to Mr. Van 
Sciver was privileged with respect to his identity. The fact that 
Mr. Van Sciver did not honor the privilege and vigorously protect 
it when subpoenaed by the Court cannot operate to the benefit of 
the prosecution. The Court, therefore, erred in admitting this 
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POINT III 
THE APPELLANT'S CO~WESSION MUST BE SUPPRESSED 
BECAUSE HIS A~~ST ~~S THE RESULT OF A PRIVILEGED 
COMMUNICATION UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY THE 
PROSECUTION. 
The appellant's statement to the police must be suppressed 
as evidence because it was secured through the unlawful breach of 
the attorney-client privilege. The use of appellant's statement 
following Mr. Van Sciver's unlawful disclosure of his identity is 
similar to certain Fourth Amendment cases examined by the United 
States Supreme Court. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 
L.Ed. 2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407 (lq63) held that verbal evidence derived 
immediately from an unauthorized arrest must be suppressed as the 
fruit of official illegality. The United States Supreme Court 
further held in Wong Sun the confession of another defendant admissib 
because the "connection between the arrest and the statement had 
become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." 
The Wong Sun doctrine was re-examined by the United States 
Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 45 L.Ed. 2d 416, 
95 S.Ct. 2254 (1975). The facts in Brown were: following an 
illegal arrest, the defendant was taken to a police station where, 
after being given the Miranda warnings, he made incriminating 
statements concerning a murder of which he was subsequently convicted 
The state supreme court held the statements admissible on the grounds 
as the United States Supreme Court described it, 
that the Miranda warnings in and of themselves 
broke the causal chain so that any subsequent 
statement, even one induced by the continuing 
effects of unconstitutional custody, was ad-
missible so long as, in the traditional sense, 
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it was voluntary and not coerced in violation 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend~ents. (422 
U.S. at 597) 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the state court ruling, 
distinguishing the purposes of the exclusionary rule to effectuate 
the Fourth Amendment from the interests and policies served under 
the Fifth Amendment. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, 
stated: 
. even if the statements in this case were 
found to be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, 
the Fourth Amendment issue remains. In order 
for the causal chain, between the illegal arrest 
and the statements made subsequent thereto, to 
be broken, \~ong Sun requires not merely that the 
statement meet the Fifth ~endment standard of 
voluntariness but that it be sufficiently an 
act of free will to purge the primary taint. Wong 
Sun thus mandates consideration of a state~ent's 
admissibility in light of the district policies and 
interests of the Fourth Amendment. (422 U.S. at 602) 
The Supreme Court set out several facts in addition to 
the Miranda warnings to be considered in assessing the voluntarine~ 
of a statement secured after an illegal arrest, including the 
temporal proximity of the arrest and confession, the presence of 
intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct. 
In the instant case, the appellant departed from his 
attorney at 8:30a.m. At approximately 1:00 p.~., he was telephore 
by Mr. Van Sciver and advised that the receipts had been turned 
over to the police but that his identity would not be revealed. 
Later the same afternoon, the appellant was arrested at his place 
of employment and taken to the Salt Lake County Attornev's Office 
for interrogation. Following a discussion with the oolice, the 
appellant gave his statement as to his involvement (TR 154). The 
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appellant's arrest and confession parallel Brown v. Illinois in 
that the confession was secured in close proximity to the unlawful 
arrest and without any intervening circumstances indicating a 
break in the causal chain. Additionally, the misconduct exhibited 
by ~r. Van Sciver and the prosecution in breaching the appellant's 
attorney-client privilege warrants the same rule of exclusion 
anplied to illegal arrests in Fourth Amendment cases. Historically, 
the attorney-client privilege has been preserved to insure the right 
of every person to freely and fully confer with a skilled legal 
counselor to secure adequate advice without apprehension of sub-
sequent disclosure by the lawyer. Baird v. Koerner, supra. The 
failure to exclude evidence obtained in breach of the privilege 
would undermine the sanctity of the privilege and encourage prosecu 
torial harrassment of attorneys who might succumb to pressure. The 
policy of insuring the legality of criminal investigations and 
arrests mandates the exclusion of the appellant's confession and 
reversal of the conviction. 
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CONCLUSIO!l 
This is a situation where the appellant sought the advice 
of an attorney whom he had known and trusted for a number of years 
in order to assist in the return of stolen property. Because the 
property was stolen, the appellant sought to maintain the utmost 
confidentiality as to his identity to avoid an embarrassing situati 
with the police. As a result of his attorney's breach of the 
attorney-client privilege, the appellant now faces imprisonment. 
Compounding the dilemma, is the patently unconstitutional 
enforcement of the Habitual Criminal Statute. This conviction must 
be reversed lest it set a dangerous precedent of vesting tyrannical 
discretion in the hands of the prosecution. 
For the reasons set forth herein, the appellant seeks 
reversal and a new trial. 
. Rez:ctfully su?mit.t// .. ' . , ' :-;!_cv~~~ J! J:rt[c"c 
LARRY R. LER 
Attorney or Defendant 
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